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1. Introduction 
In our report we will focus on the'budgetary process in the Netherlands, the 
different norms that are applicable in this process (amongst others the incor-
poration into Dutch law of the European' golden rule') and their enforceabil-
ity, both in the political arena and before the courts. We will confine our-
selves to a brief description of these topics and where necessary we will 1nen-
tion some main features of the Dutch constitutional system. We will conclude 
by summarising very briet1y the different issues we encountered 
2. Revenues and expenditures 
Article 105 of the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet, hereafter: Constitution) lays 
down the rules for the adoption and contro\1 of the State budget. Further 
rules and details on the finances of the State, including the rules on the 
accountability of the revenues and the expenditures, are laid down in the 
Government Accounts Act 2001 (Comptabiliteitswet 2001, hereafter: GAA). 
Article 105 Constitution reads as follows: 
'1. The estimates of the State's revenues and expenditures shall be laid 
down by Act of Parliament. 
2. Bills containing general estimates shall be presented by or on behalf of 
the King every year on the date specified in Article 65. 
3. A statement of the State's revenues and expenditures shall be present-
ed to the States General in accordance with the provisions of the rele-
vant Act of Parliament. The balance sheet approved by the Court of 
Audit shall be presented to the States General. 
4. Rules relating to the management of the State's finances shall be pre 
scribed by Act of Parliament.' 
The usage and meaning of the word 'control' is ambiguous. In the English language the 
meaning of the term control, and in particular parliamentary control; lies in the field of ek 
ercising influence. In this chapter we will use the word control as it is used in -the Dutch 
language. In Dutch, parliamentary control (controle), especially when used in the field of 
fue budget, refers -to repressive control. Controle means inspection, verification, d1ecking 
against fixed standards and it refers to the process of auditing the expenditure, D. 
Coombes, 'Introduction', in: D. Coombes, The Pawer of the Purse. The R.ole of European Par-
liaments in Budgetary Decisions, London: George Allen & Un-win Ltd 1976, p.15-16. 
243 
M VAN EMMERIK & G.J. GEERT}ES M. DIAf-.A.ANT, · 
. u of several budget Acts, all separately 
The annual' State budget is maded !'ccompanied by an explanatory m;mi-
t d by Act of Parliament an ·ses as an expressmn o t e 
adodu':n' The State budget as a w~~le com:ent~ 'expenditures and reve-
r:~ncipl~ of unity, the estm:iates of ;,e ~~:: the in~ome and expenses of the 
p f the States and thus covers A t the States General, or Parha-nues o . f the budget c s, II t d 
, , w·th the adoption o h ditures that are a oca e State . 
1 
. y out t e expen 
ment, authorises the miruste;et~~~;et Acts. Parliament compris':: :te :~::: 
amon the vanous items in . all . Second Chamber) an e 
of Re:resentatives (Twee_de Kamer, ~1te) Tr~ budget Act is a legislative Act on 
Eerste Kamer, literally: First Cham er . onstitution, which means it is a co-
( b . f Article 81 of the Dutch C . d the ministers accordmg the as1s o t (formed by the Kmg an 
production of govemmen d Parliament. 7 . 
to Article 42 (1) Constitution) an_ funds ielded by levying taxes) are m con-
The revenues (1.e. the pubh~ . d~hrough parliamentary approval of 
trast to the expenditures not au~ o~1sed on the basis of underlying Acts of 
the State budget. Taxes are_ aut onse x Acts are not approved armually -
Parliament: Tax Acts (Belastzngwette:{ T:ntil Parliament decides otherw,_s_e .-
t taxes are approved permanen y t d armually to Parliament. I his 
mb ots Tax Scheme (Belastingplan) is presen e d amendments to existing Tax 
u a . of the propose (. 
scheme presents an ~verv1ew reforms or policy objectives i.e. ex-
Acts in order to realise the nec~ss;ry Scheme and the State budget are pre-
penditure) of the government. T eti;; but are debated and approved sepa-
sented to Parliament at the same 
rately. 
3. The State budget 
3.1. Several budget Acts . 
\ t Parliament as mentioned m 
b dget that is presented annually_ o f tw ty-three individual The State u . . currently s consists o en Article l05(1) Constitution 
------:-----==:-:::~len:d;:ar year: Article 2 (1) GAA S budget covers one ca . 
The late . us resolutions, 
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d the States en . h ake of clanty V.· t L 
ernment an . ·1 d 14 February 2014). Fort e s . . t mpktclv correct 
grondwet.nl> - last v1s1 e h gh in the Dutch context, this is no co , 
term Acts of Parliament, alt ou ' 
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'budget chapters': thirteen departmental budgets, 9 four other budgets not 
related to the departments,10 e.g. the budget for the King, and six budget 
funds. ll Each budget is drafted, administered and executed under the re-
sponsibility of the corresponding departmental minister as head of the minis-
try. Budget funds or the 'other' budget chapters are drafted, administered 
and executed under the responsibility of the minister who is appointed by the legislator.12 
3.2. Ministerial accountability 
The ministers are responsible for the management of the budgets they ad-
minister,13 the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy that underlies the 
budgets
14 
and the efficiency of the,business operations of their ministry.IS As 
treasurer,
16 
it is the Minister of Finance who is responsible for the budget of 
national debt" and the (management of the) State's finances as a whole.
18 
The budget for General Affairs, the budget for Defence, the budget for Economic Af-
fairs, the budget for Finance and national debt, the budget for Foreign Affairs, the 
budget for Health, Welfare and Sport, the budget for Infrastructure and the Environ-
ment, the budget for Security and Justice, the budget for Social Affairs and Employ-
ment, the budget for the Interior and Kingdom Relation, the budget for Education, Cul-
ture and Science, the budget for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and the 
budget for Cenrral Housing and the Government Sector. Ministers without portfolio 
administer the last two budgets. These ministers fall under the department of Foreign 
Affairs and Interior and Kingdom Affairs respectively, but do have an individual budg-et. 
10 These are: the budget for the King, the budget for the High Councils and the Cabinet of 
the Governors, the budget for the States-General, the budget for Kingdom Relations. 
u These are: the lnfrasrructure Fund, the Municipality Fund, the Province Fund, the 
Animal Health Care Fund, the Delta Fund and the BES islands Fund. These BES islands 
are Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. Since 2010 these islands are part of the Netherlands 
and receive the status of 'special municipalities'. The Netherlands form, together with 
Cura~ao, Sint .Maarten (Saint-Martin) and Aruba, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Each 
of the countries is autonomous within the Kingdom. 
Budget funds are established by Act of Parliament in order to separately manage the 
expenditures and revenues of the government in a particular area (Article 9 GAA). 
" Article 19 GAA. The budget for the States Genera] e.g. falls under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Interior and Kingdom relations and the Infrastructural Fund falls under 
the responsibility of the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment. In the Act that 
establishes a budget fund ii is mentioned which minister is responsible for the budget fund. 
In exception to the rule that each budget is adopted by Act of Parliament, the depart-
mental minister who is also responsible for a particular budget fund can decide that the 
budget fund and the departmental budget are adopted together in an Act of Parliament. See article 1(5) CAA. 
n Article 19(1) GAA. 
1
-1 Article 20(1) GAA. 
1, Article 21(1) CAA. 
11, i\ tticle 24 GAA. 
" Article 19(2) GAA. 
1
·' Articles 20 ff. GAA. 
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liament with regard to the budget 
. . are thus fully accountable to _Par u h is not directly applicable 
Mirust;s . . ster Ministerial accountability_ tho S~ t contribution to the local 
!~br:t '.::i1, the budget fund~ ::i.:~:;:litie: ':,,d, second, to the public t the provmces an . . 
governmen s, . onomous public entities. funds that are received by aut 
nts· provinces and municipalities 3 2 1 Local govemme . . .. 
· · · . . ) and municipalities h vinces (provmcies 
rnment units, such as t e pro tonomous.19 This means 
Local g;:e) are with due observance of thRe Ila 7:o;: under whose responsi-
(gemeen , . and Kingdom e a , . nl ac 
th t the Minister of Interior . d municipalities rest, 1s o y -
bitty the budget funds of the prov~ces dan and not for the realisation of the 
i - 1 f the functioning of these un s, 
countab ~ or d t the State contribution. policy with regar 0 
3 2 2 Autonomous public entities -
. . . . . is also applicable to autonomous public 
Indirect ministerial accou;;::b:~;;ties are established to perform ~P:ylc:: 
entities.2D Autonomous pu . endent entity, not hierarc c .. 
task that is best performed by ~ nietbertands autonomous public enl!hes 
ordinated to a minister.21 In t e 1 e_ty and therefore it is very difficult to 
come in a wide variety and comp ex1 d outs in this field. Some pertaml to 
· tu of all the ms an -
1 
blic law n give a general pie re bl'c task" and some pertam o_ pu ; f 
. le law and perform a pu 1 b -,de· some entities are par o pnva d. ti lion can e u- · 
1 
·ty 
1 tt category another IS nc art of another lega entl . 
~:'e ~e;:1 entity) the State, whereas ~::e;u:i: ~ntities are wholly_ finan~~,d 
Furthermore, some of these a:t:~y~artly, or not at all, financed with pu IC 
b the State, whereas others ar . 
y h ertain to pnvate funds. . lilies though, whether t ey P_ . d fall 
All autonomous pubhc en . a State contribution, an 
or public law, are part of the Stateta~\=~::: and therefore all are listed ori 
d th authority of a departrnen . 
un er e d the local authodties wil1 
19 In section 8 the relation between the central government an 
· · d · ore detail. ent Accounts Act ~
0
·;~; -rh,S be amphfie m mtonomous public entities, the Governm etteli"ke taak) (Article 43). 
'° Next to these "'.'th legal task' (Rechtspersonen met een w 1 ith a legal task, 
'legal persons w1 a blic entities and legal persons w ·th a 
· utonomous pu Th legal person wi two categones, a . ant differences. e . · 
d but there are also import . . din a statute which task is 
corresponf , ma public task that is exphc1tly state GAA establishes that the 
:spt;r:;:ced by sta:t~:Id!::i:d ~~:,!its of this legal _Pe";;,: a:~:~~ . .,:, •;; 
minister can superVlse e . mon other things, review . 
established that the Court of Alu d1t canBl',:op deg Rijksoverhdd, Ars Aequ1: 
ti . JA Ho man, For more informa on. . . . . 
85 d 86 s public entities. 
p. . a~ .de a Framework Act on autonomou 1 Bank (De Nederlandsclw 
21 Article , un r ' t ·ty is the Dutch Centra 
22 An example of such an en_1 . 
. Slate contr1but10n. entity receives a 
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a departmental budget. A large section of the autonomous public entities is 
however (partly) financed with public funds that stem from the departmental 
budget. The minister is, similar to the funds that are provided to the provinc-
es and municipalities, not directly accountable for the policy that is realised 
by these autonomous public entities with the State contribution, but is ac-
countable for the functioning of these entities. 
The minister can, however, exercise financial supervision over a]] au-
tonomous public entities. The extent of the financial supervision varies de. 
pending on the nature of the entity. ln the most extensive form, with regard 
to public autonomous entities that pertain to public law and that are part of 
(the legal entity) the State, the armua] budget has to be approved by the min-
ister under whose responsibility the entity falls. 23 
As to the insolvency of the autonomous public entities, the Framework 
Act on autonomous public entities only entails rules with regard to entities 
that pertain to public law and that are not part of the State. These entities 
have to receive the consent of the Minister before they file a petition for 
bankruptcy or apply for a moratorium (Article 32(g) Framework Act on au-tonomous public entities). 
3.3. Budget sectors 
The State budget consists of general resources, e.g. taxes that are levied with-
out a predetermined destination. Through the adoption of the budget Acts, 
Parliament detennines the allocation of the general resources. 1he net 
amount of expenditure of the collective sector, however, not only includes 
the general resources, i.e. the State budget, but also includes the premium 
financed expenditures: the social security sector and the public health care 
sector (the so-called 'social funds'). The collective expenditure thus comprises 
three sectors: the State (in the strict sense), social security and health care. 
Premium financed expenditures are, contrary to the genera] resources, 
predetermined levies. The social funds are administrated under special ar-
rangements in which interested parties have direct representation and the 
policy is (partly) realised by autonomous public entities (as regards the social 
security) or the private sector (as regards the health sector with its privatised 
health care sector). 
24 
The social funds are not financed in whole through 
premiums but also receive a State contribution for which the ministers are 
fully accountable. Parliament only votes on and authorises those funds that 
are financed with general budget resources and thus appear on the depart-
mental budgets. Therefore, the budgetary right of Parliament, and thus the 
State budget, does not comprehend the premium-financed resources. 
" See chapter 4 of the Framework Act on autonomous public entities. 
" R. van Putten, 'De financien van de zorgsecfm', inc R. Brinks and T Witteveen, Toegang 
lot de njksbegroting, Den Haag: SDU Uitgevers 2001, p. 75. 
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4_ Budget cycle 
. ted executed, audited and scrutinised _in a 
The State budget ,s prepar~~' ~!o1;,his' recurring cycle constitutes the basis of 
recurring cycle: the bud~ i therlands and consists of five phases:" 
the budgetary system mt e e 
. h draft budgets. The Minister of 
Phase 1: The departmental preparatio~;~:ese the preparation of the budgets 
Finance supervises and coor ·bTty of the departmental 
that are prepared under the respons1 I 1 
ministers.26 . . od th draft budgets to the House 
Phase 2: The Minister of Fmance mtr uc: ~ e and the Senate consid-
of Representatives. Subsequently e ous 
er and adopt the budget Bills. p 1· ent is informed about the 
. f the budget Acts. ar iam 
Phase 3: The executwn o bud et via several budget memoran-
implementation of the State g . nd autumn these budget-
dums (four times a year). In the sp~~~: supplementary budget:" 
ary memorandums are accompa:e d ted by Parhament - pro-
this supplementary budget - w en a fop ds that go beyond those 
- · · th the necessary un 
vides the ,:nnuster w1 d b d t Durmg the execution of the 
authorised in the approve ~ ge . harged with the supervi-
b d t the Minister of Finance IS c 28 
State u ge , t f the departmental budgets. 
sion of the financial managemenhioh ns from 1 January until 31 
th b dgetary year - w c ru I Phase 4: After e u d·t d by the departmenta ac-
be 29 the budgets are au l e ) 31 
Decem r .- ,o th Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer . 
countmg offices and e d t the basis of the approved 
. timses the bu ge on r 
Phase 5: Parliament scru udit and the approved budget. Par ,a-
account of the Court of Ath t and accordingly discharges 
ment subsequently adopts e accoun 
the ministers.32 
5. Preparation of the State Budget 
. . th first two phases of the budget cycle_ in 
In this report we will _cons1der_d e the preparation of the budget, the first 
more detail. We will first cons1 er 
------------:----;:--. . en- Wolters Noordhoff 1993, p. 5 en M. 
25 H Warmelink, Parlement en begrotmg,. Crorunlg , . . . R Brinks en T. Witteveen, Tm:g,ang 
. d 'De begrotingscyc us , m. . 
Bonhof en C. Hogen oorn, · 2001 26 
tot de Rijksbegroting, Den Haag. SDU U1tgevers , P· . 
26 Article 12 and 18 CAA. 
27 Article 14 GAA. 
28 Articles 39---42 CAA. 
29 Article 2 (1) CAA t1 Bill has been tabled to the House in which. the fide,~ 
30 Article 66 and 67 CAA. Recen y aall dated under one centralised audit of Ke-
t !fices are acconuno partmental accountan s 0 
the audit office of the State. 
31 Article 82 and 83 CAA 
32 Article 64 GAA. 
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phase of the budgetary cycle. In section 5 we will consider the adoption and 
consideration of the budget by the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
5.1. Departmental preparation 
According to Article 105(2) Constitution the budget Bills containing the gen-
eral estimates are presented annually 'by or on behalf of the King'. This 
means that, contrary to the introduction of other 'regular' Bills, the budget 
Bills can only be tabled to the House by the govermnent and not by (a mem-
ber of) the House of Representatives.33 
Each budget is prepared under the administration and responsibility of 
the departmental minister who is accountable to Parliament for that particu-
lar budget. In practice, the ,individual budget is drawn up by the Financial 
and Economic Affairs deparllnent (directie Financieel-Economische Zaken) with-
in the ministry. The preparation of the budget (of the year t + l) begins in 
January (of the year I) and is concluded with the decision making on the 
definitive draft budget in August (of the year 1). 
5.2. Coordinating role of the Minister of Finance 
The Minister of Finance, who plays a key role in the preparation of the budg-
et and has to prohibit collective overspending by the departmental ministers, 
supervises and coordinates the preparation of the budgets. To this end the 
Minister of Finance draws up the armually renewed State Budget Regulations 
(Rijksbegrotingsvoorschriftrn).34 These rather detailed State Budget Regulations 
prescribe, among others, procedural and technical instructions -with regard to 
the manner that the departmental ministers should draw up their budget.35 
Next to these procedural and technical instructions, the content of the budget 
is strongly regulated by the coalition agreement (Regeerakkoord). This non-
legally binding agreement is concluded between different parties in the 
House who form the coalition government. Incorporated in the agreement is 
a budgetary (long-range) framework as well as the rules of budgetary disci-
pline that see to the enforcement of this predetermined budgetary frame-
work We will discuss these material rules in more detail in section 6. 
After the departmental minister has prepared the initial draft budget, 
he sends the budget(s) to the Minister of Finance, usually around May (of the 
year I). 36 The Minister of Finance, together with the Government Finance 
Inspectorate (Inspectie voor de Rijksfinanciiin),37 supervises and checks whether 
33 Article 82 (1) Constitution. 
34 Article 18 (1) (a) CAA. The State Budget Regulations can be found on: 
<www.rbv.minfin.nl/> (accessed on27 January 2014). 
35 The Sate Budget Regulations also entail rules with regard to the accountability of the 
budget over the previous year and the execution of the budget of the current year. 
" Article 12 (1) GAA. 
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the initial draft budgets are conform the predetermined budgetary frame-
work and if the initial draft budgets adhere to the State Budget Regulations. 
Although the Minister of Finance can make a formal objection to the draft 
budget that is drawn up by the departmental minister,38 the final decision on 
the draft budget is reached in the Council of Ministers - where every minister 
has one vote - in August (of the year t). 
5.3. Draft budgets and the state of the national economy 
Each budget is divided into several budget items ('budget articles'), which 
each contain a basic amount of information about the estimates of the reve-
nues for that year, the maximum gross amount that is available to enter into 
commitments and the maximum gross amount that is available for the ex-
penditure. 39 Accordingly the draft budgets are all accompanied by a memo-
randum of understanding in which the budget items are expanded on in 
more detail - what are the policy goals behind the amounts and how, with 
what instruments, will this policy be realised?40 The memorandum also con-
tains an account of the long-term expenditure plans. 
Accompanying the draft State budget is the Budget Memorandum 
(Miljoenen nota, literally: Memorandum of Millions)41 which surveys the en-
tire field of the State's finances and discusses the national economy in gen-
eral. The Budget Memorandum also contains the long-term estimates for the 
general State's finances. 42 It does not have the status of a Bill and is thus not 
formally adopted in Parliament, though the Memorandum is considered to 
be extremely important as it comprehends explanatory notes on what policy 
choices the cabinet makes and what these plans cost. 
Both the draft budgets and the draft Budget Memorandum are sent to 
the advisory division of the Council of State for advice. The Council of State 
has to provide the government with an independent advice on all Bills intro-
duced in Parliament by the government.43 The government is not obligated to 
ask the Council of State for advice on the Budget Memorandum. But on the 
basis of Article 17(2) Council of State Act the government can ask the adviso-
ry department to provide advice on any matter which the government deems 
necessary. The advisory department reviews the draft Bills on the basis of an 
assessment framework that comprises three elements: 1) policy analysis (are 
38 The Minister of Finance can make an objection if he considers that the draft budget runs 
against the overall financial policy or the efficient management of the State and if the 
stated amount is disproportionate to the objectives of the policy that underlies the 
budget. Article 12 (2) GAA. 
39 Article 4 GAA. 
40 Article 5 GAA. 
41 This memorandum was submitted for the first time to Parliament in 1906. The name of 
the memorandum therefore owes its name to that period. If taken literally the term Mil-
lions is no longer applicable in this age, and should be replaced by Billions. 
42 Article 13 GAA. 
43 Article 73 (1) Constitution and article 17 (1) Council of State Act. 
250 
LIMITATIONS ON GOVE 
RNMENr DEBT AND DITJC i I''-> 
~he proposed measures effective in achie . 
issues (is the legislation in line with E.;:g the proposed policy?), 2) legal 
other domestic legislation?) and 3) technical ;::an and mternational law and 
The government considers the ad . pects. 
port). The government can only d . v1cfe and writes a reaction (Nader R 
Th d . eviate rom th d . ap-
b ~ a vice and the written reaction of the gove e a vice with good reason 
u get Bills and the Budget Memorand rnment will be annexed to th~ 
House 44 and Parliament (that . H um which are submitted to th 
p··a is ouseandS e 
nns1es ag (Budget Day) th t f enate) ,s respective! 
th hi , esarto the par yon 
et rd Tuesday of September."° r iarnentary year which falls on 
6. 
The adoption of the State budget 
After the government submits the draft b 
Bills pass through Parliament like any ot~~;;s to the House, the budget 
members can Introduce amendments and . ill. Frrst the House, whose 
separately. The government in turn c;-o~ons, considers the budget Bills 
amendment (Nata van Wijziging) up till th mtroduce a memorandum of 
ed m the House." After approval by the ~ moment the budget Bill is adopt-
the Senate, whose members can intr d ouse, the budget Bills are sent to 
er to introduce amendments. o uce motions, but do not have the pow-
Although the f l bud . orma competences of Parl. . 
get Bills are similar to other Bill th . iament with regard to the 
accompanying Budget Memo d s, e nature of the State Budget and the 
budget Bills is approached sli;; ;::e;;;;e that the consideration of the 
6.1. 
Consideration of the Bills in the House 
6.1.1. General debates 
Budget Bills are in contrast to re Jar B" . 
directly in a specialised COmmitte:::f the 1}1;" which. are usually considered 
c~ns1deration in the plenary debate b" ouse ~h1ch prepares the Bill for 
with the outlines of the Budget M su iect to two general debates together 
which gives the House the o o t emorandum. The first general debate 
government and review the ~~n:r~~:~; gelnerally debate the policy of th~ 
p ica situation is called th 
44 • ' e general 
Article 12(3) and (4) GAA 
45 Article 13 GAA. . 
46 Article 65 C ti - . 
the . ons tuhon. Pnnsjesdag is for the m 
King pronounces, on behalf of th ost part a ceremonial day On this day 
speech from the throne) . th e govenunent, the Troonrede (K ;,, 
is an . In e presence of both the Ho mo s speech or 
Troon:::el~n;:~ ?£ thefge~eral policy for the coming;:: a;~~he Senate. The Troonrede 
n truster o Fmance will officiail s . e government. After the 
n:::ta dt? the House of Representatives in tru u~~t the State budget and the Miljoen-
" Arti ce m the Troonrede are amplified , c e costs of the plans that are pro-
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political debate. This debate lasts for three days and is considered to have 
great political importance. A week after the general political debate the fi-
nancial specialists of the political parties debate the general financial side of 
the submitted draft State budget with the Minister and State Secretary of 
Finance in the general financial debate. 
6.1.2. Amendments 
Members of the House can express their views on the budget in two ways: by 
introducing specific amendments or by introducing motions. 48 After the 
budget Bills and the Budget Memorandum have been discussed in a plenary 
debate, the budget Bills are submitted to specialised committees correspond-
ing to the ministries.49 From that moment, all individual membersof the House 
are allowed to introduce amendments on a particular budget article, up till 
the moment the budget Bill is adopted by the House.50 The amendment, just 
like the budget Bill itself, is adopted by a majority vote.51 
Both the estimates of the expenditures as well as the estimates of the 
revenues can be amended. However amending, either increasing or lower-
ing, the estimates of the revenues does not constitute a legally binding effect 
(for the minister). The revenues are, after all, established on the basis of un-
derlying Tax Acts. An amendment to the estimates of the revenues can only 
lead to a (more precise) adjustment of the estimates.52 As regards an amend-
ment to the estimated expenditures, the specific amendment can either in-
crease or lower the estimated amount. Corresponding with an amendnient of 
the estimated revenues, an increase in the expenditure does not constitute a 
legally binding effect. After all, with the approval of the budget, Parliament 
has authorised the minister not to exceed the allocated amount. The minister 
can thus decide to spend less. Although the minister is not obligated to spend 
the surplus, Parliamentary approval of an increase in the estimated expendi-
ture does have a political significance, which the minister cannot (too) easily 
ignore. 
48 H. Daalder and S. Hubee-Boonzaaijer (1976) 'Parliament and the Budget: Procedures 
and Politics in the Netherlands', in: D. Coombes et al., The Power of the Purse. Tiu: Role of 
European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976, 
p.2/lO. 
49 A special role is attributed to the select committee of the State Expenditure ( Commi~·sic 
voor de Rijksuitgaven). This select committee is attributed with the task of monitoring the 
proper implementation of the budget by the government. The committee also advises 
other select committees regarding issues concerning the budget. 
50 Article 84 Constitution and Article 96 Rule's- of Procedure of the House o( Representa-
tives. 
51 Article 67(2) Constitution. 
52 The total amount of revenues, after all, can only be established at the end of the (corn-
ing) budget year, with the establishment of the account. Above all, the amount of reve-
nue that will be collected is based on underlying Tax Acts. Thus in order to influence 
the amount of revenues that are collected the Tax Acts have to be amended. 
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B 
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the expenditure is mar . . . e eeway for members of the 
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members oi th gmH ate from previously established expenditures are fixed 
Am e ouse from rn k. commitments p 
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. . 1 e majo ·ty f th cunous nexu ' hi :~a:; preceding the formati~~ o7 the ec=s; ~s a_result of inter-pa:fy :eg~~ 
oeuvre and make actual han e , m1ts even more the f d 
(financial) expertise . c ges to the budget 56 Ab ree om 
that is available t th especially in comparison to the d ove all, a lack of 
to introduce am odme government, makes the memb epfarhtmental expertise 
en ents 57 ers o t e House h -1 · es1 ant 
6-1.3. Motions 
Another way memb 
is to intr d ers of the House can sp 11 
in the H:u~;~ i;;ti~ns from the moment ~t ;~~;ir vie:vs on the budget, 
request whi h . otions usually contain a wish get Bills are introduced 
or State' c is often addressed to the govern' a proposal, a judgment or a 
secretary M ti ment an · d · · 
must be co si ned o ons can be introduced by an inct· ~ 1v1dual minister 
cause th - g by four other members in d 1V1dual member, but 
the mem~:t:-:andum ac~ompanying the b:~g:; ~~llbe put to a vote_s9 Be-
n use motions to try d inf]_ I cannot be amended 
,1 The Instru ti f . an uence the policy of the minis~ 
'>1 H con ortheStateb d I pp W anneJink, Parlement en be;rai~ a ~o irn~ntions this custom. 
201()~ ~-B3o3:e
n
<l'Eert en H. Kmnmefin;o;:g~:i:;~:s~ ~o~rdhoff 1993, p. 77_ 
o1, H. Daalder. and S H l....<'. ar ement, Dev enter: Kluwer 
and p I" . . Uuee-BoonzaaiJ'e (1976 
o Hies in the Nethe l , . r ) 'Parliament and th 
European Parliament . r ands, m: D. Coombes et al. The p e Budget: Procedmes 
p. 294-295. sin Budgetary Decisions. London- G ower of the Purse. The Role of 
S7 G.D. Minderman . eorge Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976, 
uan . k . .. , Twee de Kamer en d R .. ,__ ... 
;,i . n; sfinancien in Nederl e lJII.Sfinancien. Een studi 
,~ Though only d . and, Den Haag: BJU 2000 p 133 e naar parlementaire sturing 
Attide 66 R I urmg oral debates. , . . 
u es of Procedure of the H 
ouse of Representatives. 
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ter. In addition, the memorandum contains an account of the long-term ex-
penditure plans. This long-term expenditure is becoming increasingly im-
portant to Parliament: the (annual) expenditure of the govenm1ent has to be 
seen in relation to the long-term financial framework. Specific amendments 
to the estimated expenditure on a particular budget item have little effect on 
the long term. Motions can therefore be more effective.60 But in contrast to 
certain amendments, the ministers are not compelled to honour such mo-
tions, at least for as long as they retain the general confidence of the House.61 
6.1.4. Alternative budgets 
In practice there is little room for the House to (considerably) amend the 
budget, especially considering the 'iron package' and the custom that an 
increase in expenditure is compensated elsewhere in the budget. In parlia-
mentary practice, though, there is another phenomenon worth mentioning: 
the introduction of the so-called 'alternative budget' (tegenbegroting). Differ-
ent alternative budgets are usually, at least since the first time an alternative 
budget was introduced in 1965,62 presented by several opposition parties in 
the House in reaction to the Budget Memorandum and the budget Bills. 
'Through these alternative budgets, the opposition parties try to point out to 
the cabinet alternative ways to spend the budgetary means.63 Even though 
the cabinet will only occasionally adopt (parts of) the alternative budgets, 
and an alternative budget only reflects the view of one political party, the 
introduction of alternatives budgets provide Parliament with an extr~ tool to 
(try to) influence the allocation of the budgetary means. 
After voting on the proposed amendments and the corresponding 
budgets, usually somewhere in December, the Bills are sent to the Senate for 
approval. 
6.2. Consideration of the budget Bills in the Seuate 
6.2.1. General debates 
Before the Senate considers the budget Bills it will, similar to in the House, 
dedicate two general debates, one political and one financial, to the newly-
presented policy plans of the cabinet and the financial consequences in the 
State budget. These general debates are usually held simultaneously with the 
individual budget debates in the House. The general debates in the Senate 
are politically looked upon as far less important than the general debates in 
60 G.D. Minderman, (2000) Tweede Kamer en de Rijksfinancien. Een shidie naar parlementa.ire 
sturing van rijksfinancien in Nederland. Den Haag: BJU, p. 150-155. 
61 Daalder and Hubee-Boonzaaijer 1976, p. 280. 
62 Dutch Parliamentary debates II (Handelingen II) 1965/66, p. 242. 
63 But are of course also 'used' by the opposition parties to create more visibility. 
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the House - th 1. -l e po ihcal primacy is 
e ected) House. considered t . o rest with the ( directly 
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64 
Article 93 Rul f 
65 Alth h th es o Procedure of the-Sem1.te 
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66 In 2013 ·P (accessed on g January 2014) - rn Jaarbencht_2012_20l3/f= , only four budget Bills . 
only one bud B· were discussed in ple1rnr<, d b 
Bill get ill was prepared in Writin b -:-- J • e ate all in one session And 
67 Thi:--:::i:= o~~d approved) in one se~si~: spec1ahsed committee. The rest ~f the 
Certain b . get procedure ensures that the . . 
ments udget is provided with an advance which ~ruster who is responsible for a 
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P k 68 which established a f th ailed Two ac , 
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requiredv to1·s~:::ryap::o~:~ure in place if, objectivleorfe at~~~t!;:~:dget.'69 Both 
have a re h f ely approva . M f h verruuent prevent t e _1m d ti n of the Two Pack m ay 
o t e go S t are smce the a op o . d 31 Decem-
~~3H~~~~c::! !een:':~:g th~t the budget gB~~s t::;;f::::i1 °b:dgets Bills 
' th latest ,o In 2013 the Senate mana ber at e · 
before the end of the year. 
6.2.4. Policy debates . . 
. to debate (all) the ind1v1dual budg-
Since the Senate has no real oppo;tut~;Senate in exchange, has reserved !the 
els (properly) due to time re_stram s{n the budgetary year to have a po icy 
right to seek the opportumty dur bott their budget, at least if the Senate so . th a particular mrnrster a 
debate w1 . th Kino" 
desires.71 the (formal) ratification by e ". 
After the approval of the Senate,the Official Gazette, the budget Act is 
and publication of the budget Act m 
enacted.73 
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. f the bu get. a 
and the adoptmn ° · rial rules. ,. · 
budget is also subject to certam ';'a~e down in different (legal) instruments. m 
These budgetary rules are ai in the coalition agreement and m Euro-
the Sustainable Public _Fin~ces A~d secondary legislation as well as m an 
pean legislation, both m pnmary . 
international treaty. . . ct constitutes the basic assumpt10ns 
The Sustainable Public F1nanc;s ~ t the State budget in the Nether-
£ the budgetary policy that is app ca e ~servance of the European budg-
o h" h should be enacted with due o_ h f e we will discuss the lands, w re d ds) In this section, t ere or , r mits (or EMU stan ar . 
etary I d th Council on con.unon 
p liament an e N 473/2013 of the European ar d ensuring the conec~ 
" Regulation (EU) otorin and assessing draft budgetary plan~:3] OJ L140/11. 
provisions for m~mfi it oI the Member States in the euro area [ bi uous what 'objective 
ti.on of excessive ~ c (EU) No 473/2013. It remains qmte a:m g ple also include 
69 Article 4, Regulatron t' means. Does ft for exam. 
d the control of the govemmen b d et Bills in time? 
reasons bey on r t has not been able to approve the u ~ . nformal correspond-
the fact that Par mu;;:; written correspondence (~s ." resul~ ~ea~nister of Finance) b,, 
'° See among othersHouse, the Senate, the Prime Mrmster an 13 33 181, m> C. . 
ence between the . Ministerc Kamerstukken I 2012/ ' . d ing a parha-
tween the Senate and the ~rm~ be held more than three of four times ur ' 
71 Overall policy debates w no 
mentary year of the Senate. 
72 Article 87 Constitution. 
73 Article 88 Conshtuhon. 
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Sustainable Public Finances Act, the rules that are laid down in this Act and 
subsequently the rules that are based upon the general norms that are codi-
fied in the Sustainable Public Finances Act and that are laid down in the coa-lition agreement. 
7.1. The Sustainable Public Finances Act 
With the adoption of the Sustainable Public Finances Act (Wet Houdbare 
Overheidsfinancien, hereafter: SPFA) in December 2013 the Netherlands estab-
lished a novelty: for the first time (material) budgetary rules were codified in 
Dutch legislation. This novelty though did not in fact realJy change the mate-
rial budgetary landscape in the Netherlands: the Sustainable Public Finances 
Act codifies two sets of rules that were already adhered to during the prepa-
ration and execution of !he budget. 
To begin with, we will shortly explain what kind of rules are codified in 
the Sustainable Public Finances Act. Subsequently we will further elaborate on these rules . 
First of alJ, the Sustainable Public Finances Act codifies the basic princi-
ples of the Dutch budgetary policy: the trend-based budgetary policy 
(trendmatig begrotingsbeleid). The principles of this policy, before codification, 
were concluded in the coalition agreement. The coalition agreement is con-
cluded every four years (unless the cabinet collapses and there are premature elections for the House). 
Since its introduction in 199474 by the then Minister of Finance Zalm, the 
trend-based budgetary policy (also referred to as the Zalmnonn) was, at the 
proposal of the Minister of Finance, reaffirmed each year in the newly-
concluded coalition agreement. The coalition parties in the House usually 
strictly adhere to this agreement. The cause for codification of the trend-
based budgetary policy was not because the policy was (politically) not ad-
hered to, quite the opposite/5 but because the House adopted a motion in 
which they asked the government to codify these existing rules.
76 
The second set of rules that is codified in this Act are the European 
rules on limits on government debt and deficits. These European budgetary 
rules stem from, among others, the Treaty on the functioning of the EU, in-
cluding Articles 121, 126 and 136 and the armexed Protocol no. 12 on the 
excessive deficit procedure, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
77
, the Six 
" The rules on budgetary discipline were actually introduced in 1987, but were compre-
hensively reviewed in 1994. These reviewed rules are still valid today. 
75 See section 7.2. 
~
6 
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 565, no. 4. 7 
Regulation (EU) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies and Regulation 
(EU) No 1467 /97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. 
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vember 2011 ame f h g excessive deflc1t procedure [2011 I f 16 November 2011 on 




] OJ L306/25; Regula-
No 117 and correct10n of macroeconmruc Im of the Council of 16 November ~ preU)venNtio~174/2011 of the European Parliament an~c imbalances m the euro 
tion (E o t orrect macroecono 
enforcement measures o c EU of 8 November 2011 on 
fg5{1j~J L:306/8, Council Dfrrthec!I~e !~ey:,;es [2011] OJ L:306/41, which were frameworks o e e 
for budgetary 121 126 and 136 TFEU. d f the Council of 21 
pursuant to ~tic~~ 472/2013 of the European Parharne:V":n:nce of Member Ct>,te,, w 
79 Regulation (E ) gtherung of econonuc and budgetary sd.fficulties with respect to 2013 on the stren h t d with serious 1 
::~::i ~i::l~:r;~~~~1 ~~iii~;;;;~~~~o~ulo~:;;:.~~: o!n~eember 
liament and the C~unc:;g the correction of excessive deficr: ~f 1:!:11es 121 ond 
budgetary plans an] ~rL140/11, which were enacted pursuan o 
the euro area [2013 
1 
<www conslllu 
TFEU O A I 2011 Annex 16 
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7.2 Dutch budgetary rules: trend-based budget policy and the rules 
on budgetary discipline 
The Dutch budgetary policy is codified in Article 2 SPF A. This article codifies 
the three basic principles of the trend-based budgetary policy:
83 
1) the ex-
penditure frameworks and the non-tax revenues within the budget sectors 
are fixed in advance; 2) automatic stabilisation applies to lax revenues and 
social premiums, and 3) the trend-based policy is sought after on the basis of 
the long-range figures and macro-economic assessments of the Central Plan-
ning Bureau (Centraal Planbureau). 
The trend-based budgetary policy, or Zalmnonn, aims to prevent an un-
desirable development in government spending and commitments. It focuses 
on concrete expenditure frameworks that are set for a cabinet period of four 
years and elaborated upon ih the coalition agreement.84 The coalition agree-
ment sets expenditure (and corresponding revenue) frameworks for every 
budget sector separately and subsequently for all separate departmental 
budgets on the basis of the desirable burden of expenses for the whole collec-
tive sector.
85 
Based upon this budgetary framework, the Council of M.irusters 
armually concludes a budgetary framework for that specific budgetary year 
for the separate 'budget chapters'. After the expenditure framework is fixed, 
priorities will be set within the outer limits of the expenditure framework.86 
The established budgetary framework is central to the budget process 
in the Netherlands and forms the basis of a long-term policy that prevents 
the need to react to short-term economic developments.87 Because the reve-
nue side of the budget will automatically be part of the economic cycle, the 
trend-based budgetary policy will make sure that an anti-cyclical policy is 
achieved.
88 
Adjustment of the budgetary norms is only necessary when the 
revenues, which are carefully estimated, are less than expected. 
89 
The rules on budgetary discipline subsequently try to ensure that the 
established budgetary framework is not exceeded.90 The rules on budgetary 
discipline are supervised by the Minister of Finance91 and are applied to the 
three budget sectors and to the individual departmental budgets as part of 
" Further principles of the trend-based budget policy are elaborated upon in the memo-
randum of understanding. KamerstukkeJl 112012/13, 33 416, no 3, p. 4. 
"' G.D. Minderman, (2000) Tweede Kame, en de Rijksfinancien. Een studie naar parlementaire 
sturing van njksfinanciiin in Nederland. Den Haag; BJU, p. 137. 85 
Kamerstukken lJ 2012/13, 33 416, no 3, p. 4. 
~ H. Korte, ' Het budgettair kader', in: R. Brinks en T. Witteveen, Toegang tot de R,jksbegro-ting, Den Haag: SOU Uitgevers 2001, p. 11. 87 
Kamerstukken]] 2012/13, 33 416, no 3, p. 4. 86 
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 416, no 3, p. 4-5. 
~ H. Korre (2001) 1-fet budgettair kader', in: R. Brinks, R. and Witteveen, T., Toegang lot de 
Rijksbegroting. The Hague: SOU Uitgevers, p. 11. 
~ H. Korte (2001) 'Het budgettair kader', ire R. Brinks, R. and Witteveen, T., Toegang tot de 
Rijksbegroting. The Hague: SOU Uitgevers, p. 17. 
G.D. Minderman, (2000) Tweede Kamer en de Rijksfinancien. Een studie naar parlementaire 
stunng van rijksfinancii!n in Nederland. Den Haag: BJU, p. 122 and 123. 
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the State budget. The rules on budgetary discipline entail rules on how to 
deal with overruns of the budget when unforeseen developments occur. The 
basic rule is: 'policy needs to be compensated with policy, windfalls can 
compensate setbacks'. 92 
In somewhat simplified terms the rules entail the following basic prin-
ciples:93 1) every excess on the budget is compensated, in order to prevent the 
excess resulting in an increased level of government debt; 2) compensation 
will take place within the same budget where the excess has occurred (specif-
ic compensation); 3) if the Council of Ministers decides that a minister does 
not have to compensate an excess on his own budget, compensation of the 
excess takes place on several budgets together (general compensation); 4) a 
windfall may be used to compensate a setback on the minister's own budget, 
but cannot be used for compensation to execute new policy. If a windfall 
remains after the setback has been compensated, the windfall will benefit the 
budget deficit. If the windfall is insufficient to compensate the setback, then 
the minister will have to make a cutback. Cutbacks also have to be taken if a 
certain policy is enhanced or a new policy is enacted. 
The rules on budgetary discipline are annexed to the coalition agree-
ment and further expanded on in a separate document drawn up at the be-
ginning of a cabinet period.94 This document gives more detail about what 
'budgetary rules of the game' apply to that cabinet period." These rules (can) 
thus vary slightly with each cabinet period. In the current coalition agree-
ment, for the first time the rules on budgetary discipline refer to the Europe-
an budgetary norms. The rules on budgetary discipline include the rule.that: 
'the European budgetary rules are leading'. We will tum next to these Euro-
pean norms. 
7.3. European budgetary rules: medium-tenn objective, nonns on 
deficits and debt96 
Article 2(3) SPFA implements the applicable European budgetary rules that 
should be taken into account when fixing the budgetary framework. The Act 
does not duplicate the European budgetary rules, but merely refers to them. 
Article 2(3) SPFA establishes that the trend-based policy will be implemented 
92 G.D. Minderman, (2000) Tweede Kamer en de Rijksfinancien. Een studie naar parlmu·11ti1irc 
sturing van rijksfinancien in Nederland. Den Haag: BJU, p. 124. 
93 H. Korte (2001) 'Het budgettair kader', in: R Brinks, R. and Witteveen, T., Toegang tot de 
Rijksbegroting. The Hague: SDU Uitgevers, p. 18 and G.D. Minderman, (2000) Tweede 
Kamer en de Rijksfinancien.. Een studie naar parlementaire sturing van rijksfinancie"n in Neder-
land. Den Haag: BJU, p. 124. 
94 The so-called Start Memorandum (Startnota). 
95 <www.rijksoverheid.nl/ documenten-en-publicaties/ richtlijnen/2013 / 01/14 / 
nederlandse-begrotingsregels-2013-2017.html. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 30 400, no lS, 
annex 1. 
% This section is based on: M. Diamant & ML. van Emmerik, 'Mandatory balanced budg-
et in Dutch legislation following examples abroad?', in: The Constitutionali:atim1 (fEuro-
pean Budgetary Restraints, Hart Publishing: Oxford 2014 (forthcoming). 
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with due regard to: 1) the d. 
EMU balance that applies to~ I~:~:;m objective (MTO) for a structural 
phcable standards within the E lands, 2) with due regard to th 
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_ e t. uropean Un-
Accordmg to the explanator 
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s an ar s for a structural balanced b . a ance refers to both th 
for a structural balanced bud et in udget m the SCP'" and to the standard e 
rent differentiated medium tefm bj arhcle 3 of the Fiscal Compact. The ~ 
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down respectively in article 1 f p , refers to the 3% and 60% standard I _de 
d O rotocol no 12 th a, ce ure annexed to the Eu::co e . , . on e excessive deficit 
in th~ Stability and GrowthPP:: ¼~~) ::,~a!~s and further elaborated u;~: 
entai that the government deficit rati e Fiscal Compact. These rules 
government debt cannot exceed o cannot exceed 3% of GDP and that the 
towards, 60% of GDP.'' , or should at least be sufficiently declinin 
Because the EMU balance the EMU . . g 
":{d the_ EMU debt (a maximum' of 60% GD:)ehc1t (a maximum of 3% GDP) 
a public finances, the Sustainable p bl. . are determmed on the basis of 
J:1e municipalities, the provinces and ~h le F~ances Act also establishes that 
uropean budgetary rules. But because :ioc1 funds need to adhere to these 
~: ;o ~cal gove~1.11nents; the Sustainable ;}:ii:~-based policy is not applica-
ff o,c and reg10na] authorities need to k manc~s Act establishes that 
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can be found in section 8.3.2. es at are applicable to the local authorities 
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It can be concluded from the . . . 
are applicable to the State bul::v10: section that the budgetary rules that 
State budget is established on J.e ~:sic e Netherlands are threefold. First, the 
ary pohcy that are laid down in th S prmc1ples of the trend-based budget-
based upon these basic princi !es e thustamable Public Finances Act. Second 
cr~te budgetary norms. And tJrd 'the\:o:h~o~ agreement establishes con: 
ru es that stem from the Susta· ,bl a e u get, and thus the budgetary 
agr ma e Pubhc p-
eement, have to fit within and t k . inances Act and the coalition 
rules. ' a e mto account the European budgetary 
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8 1 Judicial enforceability"' 
. . . her these budgetary norms are judkially 
First of all the question anses ;~~~ual challenge a budget Act when this Act 
enforceable? Can a group or m~t are applicable in the Netherlands? 
violates the budgetary norms t 
81.1. Sustainable Public Finances Act . 
. . . h"bited for all courts, thus includmg 
To start with, in the Netherlands 1t 1s proew1 the constitutionality of Acts of 
the Supreme Court o , unable to assess a budget c m 
(H ge Raad) to revi A t · hght 
Parliament. Dutch courts are therefore . light of the judicial assessment of 
. tuti 100 However, 1n . h 
5 
arti-of article 105 Consti o_n.. nsidered to be problematic, w erea 
the budgetary norms, this is not ~~ rules on the adoption and control of the 1 105 'only' comprehends form . dered to be part of article 
c e . 1 rules are not cons1 A t 
State's finances. More matena d . th Sustainable Public Finances c . 
105 Constitution, but can be fo: :1 ~ted to incorporate the golden rule 
The Dutch govenunent s . th Dutch Constitution. This 
(and other European budgetary n=s) o{:;:en :le would be more difficult 
would have had the advantage_ ~::d am~ndment procedure of the Constitu-
to amend, in view of the comphc . orated in the Sustainable Public F1-
tion 101 Now the golden rule, as inco: ent legislative Act.102 Even if the 
nan~es Act, can be cancelled by. a :~e s~;~titution, however, courts would . 
golden rule had been enslmn~ m h of the golden rule because of the pro~ 
not have been able to _assess a eac titutionality of Acts of Parliament. 
bition of judicial reVJew of the co~evel will after all, usually be the result 
breach of the golden rule at n:ona lar) bu'dget Act or a supplementary 
of a legislative Act, namely e (ref d the government. Breaches of the 
budget Act established by Parliamh en a; dgets would not be affected by the 
ld rule as a result of local aut onty u 
~en .. . . 
prohibition of jud1c1al rev1e:i. Public Finances Act only lays down ce:a: 
Besides, the Sustama e s guidelines to set a concrete bu g -
basic principles and norms tha(! s:r:~:pted by the Parliament and the gov~ 
ar framework. Budget Acts c s een the government and Parliament 
e~ment jointly) apply abovefrall bethi: directly.'°' This makes it qmte d1ffid-d 
· e rights om e . th trend-base citizens cannot env . h a budget Act v10lates e cult for the courts to consider whet er 
d v Emmenk2014 t 
" Th,s section ,s largely based:~ Drn=~: 'Th::"constitutionahty of Acts o! Farb;:;:; 
100 See Article 120 of the Dute ons d by the courts, (translation om 
hall not be rev1ewe ) 
and trelatieds s ndwet.nl> - accessed 14 February 2014d 1 tionof the Lower House 
deneder an segro h C stitution two readmgs, isso u 1 137 of the Dute on · d 
m See Ame e d onty m second rea mg !den rule in 
and new elections, two thrr d =;~ Boogaard to qmckly incorporate the go ndwet> -
102 See also the plea made by :er h htiek nl/begrotmgsregels-m-de-gro 
the Constitution,.<www pubhekre: tenp~ s eaking German' (n 19). 
last visited 16 September 201t :~::~knfs) 5 October 1869' W 1058. 
103 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court o t e 
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policy. This entails that the issue of the legitimacy of budget Acts is predom-
inantly a political issue about which the (ordinary) courts do not want to 
adjudicate, notwithstanding the question of whether such matters can even 
be put before these courts. Within the political arena, a judgment will have to 
be passed on the legitimacy of the budget in light of the balanced budget 
rule. In its role as independent advisor to the government and Parliament, 
the Council of State will review whether the budget Act is in line with the 
European budgetary rules (article 2(8) SPFA). 
8.1.2. European and international law104 
Though it will be difficult for an individual or group to challenge a budget-
ary Act in light of the Sustainable Public Finances Act, a direct appeal on 
European and/ or international law might also be considered. 
The European budgetary norms that are laid down in primary and secondary 
legislation have direct effect and enjoy a superior status in the Dutch legal 
order.
1
05 The European budgetary norms are however strengthened in the 
Fiscal Compact, and thus the European budgetary norms enjoy the status of 
intergovernmental international law. In the Dutch legal system though -
according to Articles 93 en 94 Constitution - provisions of ratified interna-
tional treaties
106 
also have direct effect within the Dutch legal order and enjoy 
a superior status over Acts of Parliament. 
This means that the provisions of the ratified treaty directly bind all 
branches of government (legislature, administration, judiciary) in the Nether-
lands. On the other hand, national courts are only competent to review the 
compliance of Acts of Parliament (here: budget Acts) with international trea-
ties when the provisions 'may be binding on all persons by virtue of their 
contents'. In essence, this is a matter of justiciability: does the text of the pro-
vision provide the courts with judicially manageable standards to decide the 
case? According to a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands, the justiciability is decided upon in two steps. First: is the legislature 
obligated to incorporate this specific provision into national law, which will 
further elaborate on the content and purpose of the provision? Second: is the 
provision sufficiently clear as to its objective and can the national courts di-
rectly apply it?
107 
There is extensive case law in which the national courts 
have judged that provisions of human rights treaties, in particular protecting 
civil and political rights (the European Convention on Human Rights is an 
1
04 Duplicated from Diamant and Van Errunerik 2014. 
'°' Eq judgment of 5 February 1963, Case 26/62 (Van Gend & Loos) and Eq judgment of 15 June 1964 (Costa/ENEL). 
106 
Tbe Fiscal Compact has been ratified in October 2013. 
"" Hoge Raad (Supreme G,urt of the Netherlands) 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (Spoorwegstak-ing). 
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imPortant example), are eligible to bind all persons, or to use a different term, 
are I self-executing' _1°
8 
It can, first of all, be argued that the substantive balanced budget rule as 
laid down in Article 3(1) Fiscal Compact can be separated from the institu-
tional obligation to incorporate the rule into national law as laid down in 
Article 3(2) Fiscal Compact. Therefore it can be defended that the substantive 
balanced budget rule as such does not entail the obligation to incorporate the 
provision into national law (the first requirement to be self-executing). As to 
the second requirement: is the provision in Article 3(1) Fiscal Compact suffi-
ciently clear as to its objective and can it be directly applied by the national 
courts? It is arguable that this requirement is also met, because Article 3(1) 
Fiscal Compact contains clear requirements as to what the balanced budget 
rule is and how these requirements are met. The requirements therefore do 
not have to be further elaborated upon by the national legislature and can be 
directly applied by the national courts - it is' objective law'. 
Yet another question is whether the national court will find the action 
admissible and whether the applicant has standing. How can someone 
demonstrate that it is in his or her own interest to maintain a balanced budg-
et? Consider the case in which an individual applicant might complain of a 
violation of the balanced budget rule at a local level (as the SPFA also binds 
local authorities to the European balanced budget rule) where a municipal 
. council decides to finance a soccer stadium without the necessary budgetary 
resources. The applicant will encounter all kinds of legal difficulties, like the 
requirement of relativity (the so-called' Schutz-norm': is the norm intended to 
protect the interests of the applicant?). Moreover, it is very unlikely that the 
national courts will even bum its fingers on questions regarding the en-
forcement of fiscal provisions and the review of budgetary Acts. 
8.2, Political enforceability 
The fact that it is rather unlikely that an individual or group can judicially 
enforce a violation of the budgetary norms in the Netherlands, does not 
mean that the budgetary norms are not adhered to - quite the contrary. Polit-
ical enforcement and a strong sense of political commitment to budgetary 
and fiscal norms are firmly rooted in the Netherlands. 
8.2.1. Cabinet and the Minister of Finance 
The Netherlands has demonstrated in the past that the budgetary norms, 
since the introduction of the Zalmnorm, are strictly adhered to politically.1'" In 
'°' Cf. J. UzrnM, T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Emmerik, The Dutch Supreme Court: a reluctant. 
positive legislator?, in: J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van Vliet (eds.), Netherlands Reports to 
the Eighteenth International Congress of Comparative Law, Washington 2010 Antwerp: 
Jntersentia, 2010, p. 423-462. · 
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W9 I Ll · enert and M. Jun (eds , tional Comp · , g .), The Legal Framework fo B d 
to the r~les ;;s~:dg~t~ f~s::"~in':' budgeting (3) 2004, ~- : 5, ~;~ s::t:rr;:,;i~na Intema-
surplus m the 1990s, Th p ], the general government d f . y dhenng H · e case of the Neth 1 d e KIi was turned to 
t 
e ardgues, on the basis of case studies . Ser dan s also supports the claim of Wehn a 
op- own bud tin (' m we en and So th Af . er. 
at the begiruu:; of ;e ab b:;'ding political decision about ~e to::ic;, ~t, what he_ calls, 
cipline. He claims that a~ get process'), can be a possible wa to :: of exl"'nditures 
)mpose effective fiscal con,;~;: :an~ :e 'skeptical ~bout ti;., abilitynfi~:li~:~:l dis-
suggests that this possibility is not !:tirei°'::"elves'; the case studies performed b ~: 
). Wehner, Legislatures and the B d t p y top,an, although, he adds it t1 
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House and the Senate individually, can ask the Council for advice on matters 
concerning legislation and govemance.120 
8.3.2. Court of Audit 
In addition to the Council of State, the Court of Audit plays a key role in the 
process of auditing the State's expenditures.121 The Court of Audit is not a 
judicial entity, but like the Council of State is a high council of State that pro-
vides the government and Parliament with independent advice. As regards 
the State's finances, the Court of Audit controls whether the ministers' ex-
penditures are in accordance with the adopted budgets and the intended 
policy. 
Each year the Court of Audit reviews the armual departmental financial 
reports, the annual departmenta1 trial balance, the annual non-departmental 
financial reports and the annual non-departmental trial balance. Accordingly 
the Court of Audit also reviews the annual general financial report of the 
State's fmances as a whole and the annual trial balance of the State's finances 
that are both drawn up by the Minister of Finance.122 The Court of Audit 
reviews these documents on the basis of the audits of the departmental 
budgets produced by the departmental accounting offices. The framework of 
review primarily sees to the legality, the orderliness and the verifiability of 
the financial management. This audit results in a report which is presented 
each year to Parliament on the Day of Accountability (Verantwoardingsdag): 
the third Tuesday of May when the government is held accountable by Par-
liament for the past fiscal year.123 
The Court of Audit sees to it that Parliament is provided with the nec-
essary information on the basis of which Parliament scrutinises the budget 
and can discharge the ministers. The Court of Audit subsequently draws up 
a statement of approval on the financial report of the State's finances, includ-
ing all revenues and expenditures of the departments, and the trial balance of 
the State. According to Article 105 (3) Constitution, the Court can only pre-
sent to Parliament the approved account. Therefore if the Court of Audit 
detects any irregularities in government spending and makes a formal objec-
tion, the objection has to be legitimised by an Act of Parliament before Par-
liament can discharge the ministers.124 
Besides the obligatory armual legality audit, the Court of Audit can 
perform value-for-money audits.125 This means that the Court of Audit can 
120 Article 21a Act on the Council of State. For example, the Senate asked the Council's 
advice on the matter of national parliamentary and democratic control with regard to 
the economic governance in the EMU. Dutch Parliamentary Papers I (Kamerstukken I), 
2012/13, 33 454, no AB. 
121 Article 76 Constitution and chapter VII of the Govemment Accounts Act. 
122 Articles 82 and 83 GAA. 
123 Article 83(2) GAA and Article 84 GAA. 
124 Articles 88 and 89 and Articles 64 and 83 GAA. 
125 Article 85 GAA. 
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of their autonomous tasks (regeling en bestuur inzake hun huishouding) shall be 
left up to them. This suggests that the provinces and municipalities are not 
subordinated to the national government. However, this is not completely 
true, as the functioning of the provinces and municipalities is to a large ex-
tent subject to various control mechanisms by the national government.130 For 
this reason, it has been argued that the relationship between the national 
government and local authorities should, despite the autonomous position of 
provinces and municipalities, be considered as purely hierarchical.131 Moreo-
ver, the legislature of the national government is authorised to change this 
constitutional provision without consulting the (legislature of the) provinces 
and municipalities. Lastly, the definition of the 'autonomous tasks' is rather 
vague, which entails that the national government can, to a large extent, ul-
timately decide which tasks should be carried out in co-operation with the 
national government and, concomitantly, which tasks provinces and munici-
palities can fulfil autonomously.132 Besides the provinces and municipalities, 
other decentralised authorities with ,more specific tasks can be distinguished, 
such as the water boards that are responsible for matters in the area of water 
management.133 This report, however, will mainly focus on the limits that 
apply to the budget of the provinces and municipalities, as these authorities 
have a great number of responsibilities and thus have a relatively substantial 
sum of money at their disposal.134 The other decentral authorities have fewer, 
more fixed, tasks and therefore less money at their disposal.135 
9.2. The budget authority of provinces and municipalities 
The formally autonomous position of the provinces and municipalities en-
tails that they have their own budget authority: under Dutch law, provinces 
and municipalities are, within certain limitations, authorised to impose taxes 
on their O"'Wn citizens. However, a significant part of the budget of the prov-
inces and municipalities is funded by the national government and therefore 
subject to central government control.136 The allowances from the national 
no P.P.T. Bovend'eert and C.AJ.M. Kortmann, Constitutional Law of the Netherlands, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 42. 
111 See eg S.E. Zijlstra, Bestuurlijk organisatierecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 64. 
m See eg W. van der Woude, 'Houdbare overheidsfinancien en gemeentelijke autonomie', 
A,s Aequi 2013, 61(12), p. 919. 
11
·1 See more extensively on the differences between these two types of local authorities, 
P.P.T. Bovend'eert and C.A.J.M. Kortmann (2007) Constitutional Law of the Nether-
lands, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. p. 42-56. 
111 See eg A.H.M. Dolle & D.J. Elzinga, Handboek van het Nederlandse gemeenterecht, Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2004, p. 532. 
\'l'i As to the position of the water boards in relation to the national government, see eg C. 
Hoeben, 'Financiele verhouding tussen waterschappen en rijk', Tijdschriftvoor Openbare 
Financien 2012, 44(1), p. 58-65. 
1
"-' In 2008, for instance, the national government funded 72% of the budget of the provinc-
es and 79% of the budget of the municipalities, see Dutch Parliamentary Papers II (Ka-
1tterstukken II) 2009/10, 32 249, no 2, p. 7-8. 
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government can be d_ivided into the general allowances from the Pr9vince 
Fund (Pnwinciefonds) for the provinces and the Municipality Fund (Gemeente-
fonds) for the municipalities. The Dutch Financial Relations Act (Financii!le-
verhoudingswet; hereafter FRA) stipulates that the amount of money that 
provinces and municipalities receive from the national government must be 
determined on the basis of some particular characteristics of the provinces 
and municipalities, such as the population and surface area of the territory 
(Article 8), taking the differences between the various provinces and munici-
palities into account (Article 7). If the costs of municipalities exceed this al-
lowance considerably for a substantial period, they can request an additional 
allowance (aanvullende uitkering).137 The FRA provides that local authorities 
can only receive such an allowance as long as their own tax revenues are at a 
reasonable level (Article 12). The question whether a municipality qualifies 
for such an additional allowance is merely a matter of policy and has to be 
decided upon on the basis of the municipality's long-term budget.138 
Additionalo/, municipalities and provinces can receive specific allow-
ances (specifieke uitkeringen), which have to be spent in accordance with par-
ticular objectives. These allowances can only be allocated to the extent that 
the objectives are not covered by the standards o:h the basis of which the 
general allowances are allocated (Articles 15 and 16 FRA). For this reason, 
specific allowances have been considered to be quite controversial, as the 
national government has a strong hold over how local authorities can spend 
these allowances. It has been argued that the specific allowances, in this way, 
enable the national government increasingly to dominate the provinces and 
municipalities, which would endanger their autonomous position.139 Hence, 
the allocation of specific allowances has to be governed by or pursuant to an 
Act of Parliament or, in the case of a specific allowance that is allocated tem-
porarily, by an Order in Council (bij algemene maatregel van bestuur) (Article 17 
FRA). Recently, in light of the objections concerning the specific allowances, 
the national government has been reducing these allowances successfully by 
consolidating a great number of them into so-called 'collected allowances' 
(verzameluitkeringen), which are to a lesser extent linked to specific objectives 
(article 16a FRA), and by terminating many others.140 Additionally, in the 
context of the local authorities' budget, it should also be noted that provinces 
and municipalities might receive subsidies from the European Union. These 
allowances may also be linked to particular objectives. Finally, another lirni-
tation on the budget authority of local authoritii,s, which has been recently 
enacted, involves the obligation to save its surplus funds in the National 
Treasury instead of their own bank accounts (Article 2(1) Financing of Decen-
137 This provision does not apply to the provinces. 
138 A.H.M. Dolle and D.J. Elzinga (2004) Handboek van het Nederlandse gemeenterecht. Deven-
ter: Kluwer, p. 535. 
139 Ibid., p. 536. 
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ment may deduct this, to the extent that it can be ascribed to them, from the 
allowances that they allocate to the provinces and municipalities (Article 7 
SPFA). Even if the Commission is not planniug to impose a fine on the na-
tional government, the budget of the provinces and municipalities can be 
reduced. The local authorities then get the chance to balance their budget 
within tluee years after which the national government may reimburse the 
provinces and municipalities (Article 6(3) SPFA). In both scenarios, it is the 
Minister of Finance who ultimately decides to what extent the allowances of 
the decentralised authorities may be deducted. Strikingly, the SPFA holds the 
provinces as a whole and the municipalities as a whole responsible for adhering 
to the EMU standards (Article 6(2) SPFA). This means that provinces and 
municipalities can be held responsible for defects in the budget policies of 
other provinces and municipalities. According to Van der Woude, this is 
highly problematic as provinces and municipalities do not have the power to 
influence the decision-making proc~sses outside their lerritory.144 Hence, the 
SPFA has rendered provinces and municipalities responsible for the deci-
sions of other local authorities that they cannot influence. 
9.3.3. Control on the spending of specific components of the local au-
thorities' budget 
Some components of the budget of provinces and municipalities, such as the 
specific and additional allow:?fices, are linked to particular objectives. Hence, 
it has to be verified whether these 'labelled' components of the local authori-
ties' budget have been spent lawfully. For instance, the way in which local 
authorities spend their additional and specific allowances is subject to rela-
tively strict control by the Dutch Minister of Interior and Kingdom Rela-
tions. 
145 
As to the additional allowance, various measures can be imposed on 
municipalities that receive such an allowance. These measures include the 
obligation to set up a debt restructuring plan, the requirement of a recruit-
ment freeze and the requirement of an expenditure ceiling.14<> As to the specif-
ic allowances, the Dutch Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations checks 
on the basis of the annual statement of the local authorities, firstly, whether 
the provinces and municipalities have spent these allowances in accordance 
with the objectives for which these were intended and, secondly, whether 
these allowances were spent in accordance with the specific rules that were 
set up for spending these allowances (Article 17 FRAJ. The control regime of 
the minister is considered to be relatively strict. In case the specific allowanc-
es have not been fully spent or have not been spent lawfully, the minister can 
re-claim the allowances, depending on the applicable rules. This also applies 
144 
Van der Woude 2013, p. 919. 
145 
Van der Woude 2011, p. 261. 
'¾ Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Instructions for the apphcation of 
article 12 FRA [Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Handleiding 
art. 12 Fvw], The Hague, 2013, p. 15. 
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to the control on the timely provision of the relevant information as to the 
spending of the specific allowances by provinces and municipalities. If the 
provinces and municipalities do not fulfil this obligation, the minister may 
stipulate that the allocation of general allowances from the Province Fund and 
the Municipality Fund to the local authority concerned will be suspended for 
six months.147 Lastly, under the Compliance of Local Authorities with Euro-
pean Union Law Act (Wet Naleving Europees recht door publieke mtiteiten) the 
ministers of the central government have the competence to control whether 
local authorities satisfy their legal duties under European Union law. These 
duties involve, for instance, the spending of European subsidies by local 
authorities in accordance with the objectives for which they were intended.148 
10. Summary 
In the introduction to this contribution we promised to briefly summarise 
our findings and in doing so attend to the questions posed by the general 
reporter. 
Until recently there were no legal or constitutional limits for the nation-
al govemn1ent to incur deficits in its annual budget, nor on its ability to bor-
row money or incur debt. With the adaption of the Sustainable Public Fi-
nances Act in December 2013 the Netherlands has established a novelty: for 
the first time two sets of (material) budgetary rules have been codified in 
Dutch legislation. On the one hand the trend-based budgetary policy and on 
the other hand (a general reference to) the European golden rule and other 
European budgetary norms that apply to the Netherlands. This novelty in 
fact did not really change the material budgetary landscape in the Nether-
lands: the SPFA codifies two sets of rules that were already adhered to dur-
ing the· preparation and execution of the budget. The specific budgetary 
framework is elaborated upon in the non-legally binding coalition agree-
ment. This detailed budgetary framework is subject to the rules on budgetary 
discipline that should ensure that the budgetary framework is adhered to 
during the coalition period. The Minister of Finance supervises the rules on 
budgetary discipline. 
At the local level certain legal limitations exist on govermuent debts 
and deficits. The superior administrative authority has the power to control 
the compliance of the local authorities with these limitations. According to ·-·•·.-·•••<·•· 
the SPFA the local authorities also have to adhere to the European budgetary 
norms. Ultimately, though, it is the national govermuent that can be held 
accountable at the European level for the non-compliance of the Europe_an 
budgetary norms by the local authorities. 
147 See, eg, Vander Woude 2011, p. 260. 
148 See more extensively on the legal aspects of the spending of European sul,siilies by 
authorities, C. de Kruif, Onderlinge overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor 
pees recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2012 and J.E. van den Brink, De uitvoering van Eu,,op,,se su•,••• 
sidieregelingen in Nederland, Deventer, Kluwer, 2012. 
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